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We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set 
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political parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have 
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1 Introduction
People talk about the quality of politicians as much as the quality of their policy. This is not
surprising, because the quality of politicians profoundly aﬀects the quality of their policy.
More surprisingly, politicians’ quality is often ignored in the economic analysis, although
the quality of their policy is carefully scrutinized. By politicians’ quality we simply mean
their ability to maximize welfare by making and carrying out decisions on behalf of the rest
of society. Such skills are in scarce supply in society. Voters would like to elect competent
citizens as their representatives but, typically, these also fare well outside politics. There is
also concern that the attraction of governmental posts has been eroding. For example, the
Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2001) reports
that while in 1980 three-quarters of American graduates from his school went to work for
the government, the share has dropped in two decades to one third. This would suggest that
making a career in government attractive for the most able would call for considerable wage
increases. It has indeed often been argued - especially by politicians themselves - that the
reward for holding public oﬃce should be increased to improve the candidate quality.1 There
is, however, an elementary property of politics that may render such an action ineﬃcient at
best and detrimental at worst. Increasing the reward level may make politics more lucrative
not only to high-ability citizens but also to low-ability citizens, who also have a chance in
elections due to electoral uncertainty. The purpose of this study is to provide a stylized
framework to examine when the candidate quality increases with the reward level, and when
it does not.
Because the citizen-candidate models of representative democracy, pioneered by Osborne
and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), render the set of candidates endogenous,
they provide a natural framework for our study of the candidate quality. In an archetypal
citizen-candidate model any citizen may enter electoral competition at a cost, and then all
citizens elect politicians from the group of self-declared candidates. Such a simple description
of democracy involves many attractive properties, but it renders political parties redundant,
which contrasts with their prominent gategeeping role in modern elections. Often only
citizens nominated as candidates of a major party stand a realistic chance, especially in
national elections. We extend the citizen-candidate approach by adding two parties, and
assume that the parties select candidates for the general election from the citizens who would
like to become candidates. The citizens diﬀer in their earning potential outside politics and in
their competence in the oﬃce but, for each citizen, the earning potential and competence are
1For example, the argument has been put forward to justify the proposed wage increases for the members
of the European and Swedish Parliaments. It was one of the main justiﬁcations for the 35% increase in the
salaries of the members of the Finnish Parliament in 2000.
2positively correlated. Voters would like to have competent oﬃce holders, but the candidates
have private information about their ability. Campaigning creates a noisy signal of the
ability of citizens entering politics. To capture the inherent random factors of political life,
we assume that candidates know only their probability of emitting a good signal. Citizens
contemplating candidacy have to weigh the expected payoﬀ from winning an election against
campaigning costs and income available outside politics.
Our analysis reveals that the eﬀects of the reward for oﬃce holders and campaigning
costs are not straightforward. Although our model predicts that the candidate quality is
increasing in the reward for low campaigning costs, the prediction is reversed for suﬃciently
high campaigning costs. The ﬁnding has far reaching implications. In designing the optimal
rewards for the elected oﬃcials, the campaigning costs should be given proper attention.
It may be possible to design rewards to screen the best candidates, but only when the
campaigning costs are high. When they are low, there is no way to deter low-ability citizens
from running for oﬃce.
We build on strong foundations. There is an extensive literature in which representa-
tive democracy is regarded as a principal-agent relationship where voters delegate political
power to selected candidates.2 Such delegation of decisions leads to well-known problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard problem arises, as politicians need not
act in the interest of their voters. Diﬀerent aspects of moral hazard are studied in an exten-
sive literature emerging from inﬂuential contributions by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986).
S i n c ei ti sd i ﬃcult to provide formal incentives in politics, implicit incentives in the form of
career concerns may mitigate the moral hazard problem (Holmström, 1982, and Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). Adverse selection problem results from asymmetric information concerning
the quality of candidates or platforms, as well as from the fact that voters can select politi-
cians only from those citizens who run for the oﬃce. Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ
(1990) show that when incumbent politicians have private information on their competence,
career concerns may lead to political budget cycles.3
Recent research has raised some fresh issues concerning the quality of politicians. Our aim
is closely related to the intriguing papers by Caselli and Morelli (2002), Messner and Polborn
(2003), and Besley (2003) who also emphasize the payoﬀ from winning an election and the
opportunity cost of candidacy in determining the quality of politicians.4 There is, however,
a number of major diﬀerences between our work and theirs. For example, Caselli and Morelli
(2002) assume that candidates know in advance whether they can convince the electorate
of their quality and Messner and Polborn (2003) assume that the abilities of candidates
are observable to voters, but their opportunity costs are private information. Besley (2003)
2For excellent surveys, see Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
3More speciﬁcally, the principal-agent relationship in our model as well as in Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988)
and Rogoﬀ (1990) involves asymmetric information about the quality of the agent, whereas Holmström’s
(1982) original career concern model and its extension to politics by Persson and Tabellini (2000) invoke on
the assumption of imperfect but symmetric information about the quality of the agent.
4We became aware of contributions by Besley (2003) and Messner and Polborn (2003) after having
completed our study independently.
3focuses on the agency problem of incumbents subject to a two-period limit, assuming a
random selection of politicians and abstracting from campaigning costs. There is also a quite
close link to Carrillo and Mariotti (2001) who, like us, analyze the quality of candidates in a
two-party system where electoral campaign provides voters with information on candidates.
Their focus is, however, on the eﬀects of electoral competition on the turnover of candidates
and their model is not based on the citizen-candidate tradition. In drawing attention to
the role of political parties, we are inﬂuenced by Caillaud and Tirole (2002) who argue
that parties act as intermediaries making up voters’ informational deﬁcit by designing and
endorsing platforms and regulating competition among like-minded politicians. Although
they analyze a richer spectrum of intra-party competition than we do, they also take the
identity and competence of the two competing politicians or factions as given. In contrast,
we emphasize the role of party primaries as screening device to select candidates for the
general election, analyzing both primaries with and without informational signals.
In the next section we present our model. It has only three parameters: the reward for
oﬃce holders, campaigning costs, and the citizens’ ability level. The values of the parame-
ters specify the choice between politics and a private career. In section 3, we characterize
the political equilibria. There turns out to be a unique equilibrium set of candidates for a
given campaigning cost and a given reward. We show how the level of campaigning costs
determines whether an increase in the reward for oﬃce holders increases or decreases the
candidate quality. The political system that screens the best candidates is assessed in sec-
tion 4. Although the focus of this paper is on the eﬀects of the reward for oﬃce holders
and campaigning costs on candidate quality, our model is sparse and tractable enough to
accommodate a variety of extensions. In section 5 we consider campaigning costs in both
primary and general elections, introduce ideological dimension into political competition,
and raise the question of whether the primaries of established parties can work as screening
device. Other plausible extensions, like campaign contributions, lobbying, incumbent advan-
tage, and corruption, are left for future research. Ways to pursue them are brieﬂy discussed
in the concluding section (section 6).
2T h e M o d e l
The polity consists of a continuum of citizens who can be identiﬁed by their abilities.5 Citizen
i’s ability is denoted by ai and, for simplicity, the ability level is assumed to be uniformly
distributed on a unit interval, i.e., ai ∈ [0,1]. As we will explain in detail below, the ability
has a dual role in our model: both the citizen’s reservation wage outside politics and the
probability of electoral success depend on it. We do not explicitly model the role of policy-
makers, but simply assume that representative oﬃcials are needed to make decisions on
5The assumption that there is a continuum of citizens is adopted for notational convenience (cf. also
Besley, 2003). Strictly speaking, the standard Nash equilibrium test of one deviating citizen is rather weak
with inﬁnite number of citizens, but we construct equilibria as if there were a ﬁnite but large number of
citizens who are indexed according to their ability.
4behalf of the rest of society. The higher are the representatives’ abilities, the better they can
serve the interests of society. The representatives are selected in an election.
We study a two-party system where there are twice as many candidates as seats. The
constitution speciﬁes that all citizens, including the candidates, have one vote, which is valid
only if cast for an oﬃcial candidate. The oﬃcial candidates are nominated by the parties,
who select their candidates from the citizens standing for party primaries. All citizens may
present themselves as potential candidates in party primaries. The candidate receiving the
majority of votes in the general election is elected. In the event of a tie, the winner is selected
by a lottery.
The decision whether to enter politics or not is based on the maximization of the expected
utility. Unsuccessful candidates and the citizens abstaining from the political campaigning
collect their reservation wages. The citizens’ reservation wages depend on their abilities.
Without loss of generality, we assume that citizen i earns ai outside politics.6 Each candidate
incurs a private campaigning cost, e, regardless of the eventual outcome of the election. A
successful candidate, an elected oﬃcial, is rewarded by π. For the moment, we take e and π
as exogenous but, in section 4, we seek the values of e and π that maximize the candidate
quality. Note that e and π need not to be monetary. For example, campaigning may involve
psychological costs such as losing privacy and being subject to searching journalism. Being
elected, on the other hand, may give ego rents as discussed, e.g., in Rogoﬀ (1990).
Voters do not know the candidates’ abilities, but the campaigning eﬀort creates a noisy
signal s ∈ {L,H} of the ability level where the signal can take only two values, high (H)
and low (L). We assume that the probability of signal H is increasing in the candidate’s
ability. More speciﬁcally, the probability that candidate i emits signal H is given by
Pr(si = H | ai)=ai. (1)
The complementary probability, i.e., the probability that candidate i signals L,i st h e n
Pr(si = L | ai)=1− Pr(si = H | ai)=1− ai. (2)
In other words, the higher is the citizen’s ability, the more competent is the citizen both in
politics and in private sector.
The electoral game in our model has three stages. The ﬁrst stage is the entry stage,w h e r e
each citizen decides whether to stand for an election or not. In the second stage the parties
select their candidates from the set of the citizens who express an interest in candidacy in
the ﬁrst stage. We thus call the second stage the primary stage. The third is the voting
stage, w h e r et h ec i t i z e n sv o t ef o ro n eo ft h ec a n d i d a t e s .T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si ss u m m a r i z e d
in Figure 1.
We construct political equilibria of the model by using the concept of a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Such equilibria consist of three components: 1) Citizens’ candidacy strategies,
6Regarding the reservation wage as c+bai,w h e r ec and b are positive constants, would not qualitatively
change the analysis.








Figure 1: Electoral Game
i.e., decisions whether to enter primary elections. Let Ii ∈ {0,1} denote citizen i’s entry
decision where Ii =1if the citizen enters the primaries and Ii =0if he or she does not.
2) Citizens’ voting behavior describes how the citizens vote as a function of the information
they have received in the campaign. To reduce the number of equilibria, we assume that
all vote, all voters prefer the candidate with higher expected ability, and all vote as if they
were pivotal. 3) Voters’ belief function describes a common assessment that candidate i is
of higher expected ability than candidate j conditional on the variables that voters observe.
In other words, given Ii, Ij, si,a n dsj, voters can share one of three alternative beliefs.
We denote the belief that E(ai) >E (aj) by 1, the belief that E(ai) <E (aj) by −1,a n d
the belief that E(ai)=E(aj) by 0.L e tµ(Ii,I j,s i,s j) ∈ {1,−1,0} denote the voters’ belief
given the candidates’ entry decisions and the signals they have emitted. As shown in the
Appendix, Bayes’ rule implies that µ(1,1,H,L)=1 , µ(1,1,L,H)=−1, µ(1,1,H,H)=0 ,
and µ(1,1,L,L)=0 .
For most part of the paper we focus on symmetric political equilibria where voters favor
neither party ex ante and, consequently, the abilities of the candidates of the two parties
follow the same distribution. There are two alternative mechanisms through which this may
arise. In the absence of ideological motivations, we assume that citizens interested in candi-
dacy either randomly choose in which party to run, or that citizens are randomly assigned
to the two parties before deciding whether they want to run. In section 5.2 we consider
ideologically minded voters while maintaining the assumption on the symmetric ability dis-
tribution of the parties’ potential candidates. We brieﬂy discuss such asymmetric political
equilibria where the abilities of the parties’ candidates come from diﬀerent distributions in
the following section.
62.1 Voting Stage
Given the belief µ and our assumptions on voting behavior, a candidate signalling H wins
the election with a probability of one, when the opponent signals L. If both candidates send
the same signal, each candidate wins with a probability of one-half. In sum, if candidates i
and j run for an oﬃce, candidate i wins with a probability of p(w | ai,a j),w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
p(w | ai,a j)=P r ( si = H | ai)Pr(sj = L | aj)+
1
2 [Pr(si = H | ai)Pr(sj = H | aj)+P r ( si = L | ai)Pr(sj = L | aj)]. (3)
Substituting (1) and (2) for (3) and simplifying, (3) can be expressed as:




Equation (4) captures the inherent uncertainty of democratic elections. While the probability
of being elected is increasing in candidate’s relative ability, the better candidate cannot be
certain of winning the election.
2.2 Primary Stage
The primary stage is rather mechanic. For the moment we assume that the selection process
inside the parties is costless, but in section 5, we consider costly primary elections and
primary elections with signaling. There is a set of primary election candidates C(e,π) who
have committed to campaigning if nominated as the oﬃcial candidate of a party. There are
no signals before campaigning and, consequently, the parties select their oﬃcial candidates
from the citizens running for oﬃce randomly. In other words, if the set of candidates is
non-empty, each party takes an independently and identically distributed draw from the set
and nominates the selected citizen as the party’s oﬃcial candidate. The selection process is
similar to the selection of new candidates in Carrillo and Mariotti (2001) except that here
the set of potential candidates is endogenous. Carrillo and Mariotti (2001) assume that
parties choose between retaining the established candidate and selecting a new candidate
whose ability is a random draw from an exogenous distribution.
We can now proceed to the ﬁrst stage where the agents choose whether they pursue a
career in politics or remain ordinary citizens.
2.3 Entry Stage
Note that (4) measures the winning probability after both parties have nominated the candi-
dates. When a citizen contemplates candidacy the winning probability should be calculated
before the parties select their candidates. Formally, if citizen i decides to run for oﬃce, the




p(w | ai,x)f(x)dx,( 5 )
7where f(x) is the density function of potential candidates’ abilities. In (5) a and a denote
the lowest and highest ability of the potential opponent with 0 ≤ a ≤ a ≤ 1. The ability
thresholds are determined as a part of the equilibrium, but each citizen takes them as given
when deciding whether to run for oﬃce or not. We proceed under the assumption that the
set of those willing to become candidates is a continuum, C(e,π)=[ a,a],a n dt h e nc o n ﬁrm
that the assumption is fulﬁlled in equilibrium.
By using the assumption of a uniform distribution and (4), the probability that citizen i






(1 + ai − x)dx. (6)







2 denotes the average quality of potential candidates. Comparing (7) and (4)
clearly shows the diﬀerence in the winning probabilities before and after the primary stage.
Before the primary stage citizen i contemplating candidacy evaluates the winning probability
a g a i n s tt h ea v e r a g eq u a l i t yo ft h eo t h e rc a n d i d a t e s . T h ec i t i z e nh o w e v e rk n o w st h a ta f t e r
the primaries, he or she needs to defeat only the candidate of the other party instead of all
candidates. Given the campaigning cost, e,t h er e w a r df o ro ﬃce holders, π, the reservation
wage, ai, the belief, µ, and the voting behavior, citizen i decides to run for oﬃce only if:
P(w | ai)π +( 1− P(w | ai))ai − e ≥ ai,( 8 )
where the left-hand side and the right-hand side capture the expected payoﬀ of running for
oﬃce and the outside option. Inserting (7) into (8) and simplifying yields:
1
2
(1 + ai − A)(π − ai) − e ≥ 0.( 9 )
Equation (9) holds as an equality for the pivotal citizens who are indiﬀerent between a public
and private career. Letting (9) be an equality and rearranging gives the condition
−a
2
i + ai (π + A − 1) + π(1 − A) − 2e =0 .( 1 0 )
As the left-hand side of (10) is a downward-opening parable, the values of a satisfying (9)
are between the values that solve (10). Thus, if a solution exists, it satisﬁes our hypothesis
that all citizens between a and a are interested in candidacy. However, the solutions of (10)
need not to be on the open unit interval. Upon solving (10) for ai, we can write the ability
level of the pivotal citizens as:
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3.1 Political Equilibria
In this section, we determine political equilibria corresponding all non-negative values of
the reward for oﬃce holders and campaigning costs. It is instructive to divide parameter
space {e ≥ 0;π ≥ 0} into diﬀerent regions according to what is the ability range from which
citizen-candidates enter politics. It turns out that the equilibria we specify are unique for
each combination (e,π). One type of equilibria is a pooling equilibrium where the set of those
willing to become candidates C(e,π)=[ 0 ,1].W e c a l l i t universal democracy.T h e n t h e r e
are potentially three types of semiseparating equilibria, mediocre candidates when C(e,π)
=[ a,a] with 0 <a≤ a<1, competent candidates when C(e,π)=[ a,1] with a > 0,a n d
incompetent candidates when C(e,π)=[ 0 ,a] with a<1.7 Finally, we take that there is a
collapse of democracy when the parties cannot be certain that they are able to nominate
a candidate. Fortunately, it turns out that various political equilibria can be characterized
by dividing the campaigning costs into three ranges. We say that campaigning costs are
relatively high when e>e ≡ 1
2. Accordingly, they are called relatively low when e<e≡ 3
8
and moderate when e ∈ [e,e].
Using the aforementioned terminology we will ﬁrst present six Lemmas characterizing
the political equilibria. The proofs of Lemmas are relegated to the Appendix. We then
invoke on the Lemmas to derive the two main results concerning the impact of π and e on
the candidate quality. We ﬁrst prove:
Lemma 1 There is no mixed strategy equilibrium where a positive mass of citizens would be
indiﬀerent between standing for an election and staying outside politics.
Proof. See the Appendix
Because Lemma 1 means that examining mixed strategy equilibria is inconsequential, in
what follows, we focus on equilibria in which citizen-candidates play pure strategies, i.e.,
they either stand for an election or stay outside politics.
Lemma 2 Universal democracy exists when campaigning costs are at least moderate and
π ≥ 4e or when campaigning costs are low and π ≥ 1+4
3e.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 simply says that when the reward for oﬃce holders is suﬃciently high relative
to the costs of campaigning, everyone is willing to gamble and become a candidate.
Lemma 3 Candidates are mediocre when campaigning costs are moderate and
π ∈ (1 +
√
1 − 2e,2 −
√
1 − 2e).
7Of course, the average qualities of candidates in various equilibria correspond the names of the equilib-
ria. That is, the highest average quality is in the competent-candidates equilibrium and the lowest in the
incompetent-candidates equilibrium, and so on. The calculations proving the point are available from the
authors on request.
9Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 suggests that mediocrity creates mediocrity. The expected competence of
elected politicians is moderate if the reward for oﬃce holders and campaigning costs are
neither high nor low.
Lemma 4 Candidates are competent when campaigning costs are high and π ∈ [2e +1 ,4e)
or when campaigning costs are moderate and π ∈ [2 −
√
1 − 2e,4e).
Proof. See the Appendix.
There are two requirements for the high expected competence of elected politicians. The
campaigning costs should be suﬃciently high and the reward for oﬃce holders suﬃciently
low to deter low competence citizens from politics. The reward for oﬃce holders, however,
should not be too low so that it dilutes the high ability citizens’ incentives to engage in
politics.







or when campaigning costs are low and π ∈ [2e,1+4
3e).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 5 gives a warning that the expected quality of politicians may be low when the
campaigning is cheap. In such a case, especially the low-ability citizens are willing to take
the gamble and run for oﬃce.
There are also equilibria without a properly working democracy. We take that democracy
collapses if there is no symmetric political equilibrium where both parties are certain to
nominate a candidate.
Lemma 6 i) If π<e , neither party is able to nominate a candidate. ii) If π ∈ [e,2e),o n l y
one of the parties is able nominate a candidate. iii) If π ∈ [2e,1+2e) and campaigning costs
are high, there is no symmetric political equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix
The interpretation that democracy collapses is quite appropriate when π<2e, i.e., when
there are no candidates or only one party has a candidate. We are perhaps taking the
interpretation to the limit when we say that democracy will collapse if there is no symmetric
political equilibrium. But in so far there is no a priori reason for the potential candidates of
t h et w op a r t i e st oh a v ed i ﬀerent ability distributions, we hope that the interpretation is not
completely unwarranted. The explanation why democracy can collapse is straightforward.
If the reward from winning an election is smaller than campaigning costs, citizens do not
enter politics even if they were certain to win the election. If the reward is low but slightly
above the campaigning costs, citizens may stand for an election if they are rather certain
of winning it. But if both parties could nominate a candidate, the probability of winning
cannot exceed one half for both candidates. This unravels all the symmetric equilibria where
both parties nominate a candidate.
We capture the consequences of Lemmas 1-6 in Proposition 1 and Figure 2.
10Proposition 1 i) When campaigning costs are low, there is universal democracy for π ≥
1+4
3e and candidates are incompetent for π ∈ [2e,1+4
3e).
ii) When campaigning costs are moderate, there is universal democracy for π ≥ 4e,c a n d i -
dates are competent for π ∈ [2 −
√









, and candidates are incompetent for π ∈ [2e,1+
√
1 − 2e].
iii) When campaigning costs are high, there is universal democracy for π ≥ 4e, candidates
are competent for π ∈ [2e +1 ,4e), and there is no symmetric political equilibrium for π ∈
[2e,2e +1 ) .
iv) If π<2e one or both parties fail nominate a candidate.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 1-6.
As one would expect, when the payoﬀ from winning an election is suﬃciently high, every-
one is willing to gamble and run for oﬃce. Analogously, when the payoﬀ is suﬃciently low,
no one is willing to sacriﬁce the campaigning costs to become a candidate. The ﬁndings are
somewhat more surprising when they are evaluated against the common view (and the ﬁnd-
ings in Caselli and Morelli, 2002) that increasing the reward for oﬃce holders or decreasing
the campaigning costs increases the candidate quality. Proposition 1 suggests that the range
of parameters where the common view holds is rather restricted. When the campaigning
costs are high, the reward for oﬃce holders should be decreased to screen the best candidates.
When campaigning is costly, the low ability citizens are reluctant to run for the oﬃce, since
their prospects to be elected are low. Thus, decreasing the expected returns on campaigning
eﬀectively excludes the low-ability citizens from the set of candidates. In contrast, when
campaigning is cheap, there is no way to screen the best candidates, because the low ability
citizens are eager to run for oﬃce even when the payoﬀ from winning is low.
Note that our ﬁndings do not hinge on the multiplicity of equilibria.
Proposition 2 Provided that democracy does not collapse, there is a unique symmetric
political equilibrium for a given campaigning cost and a given reward.
Proof. It directly follows from Lemmas 1-6 and Proposition 1 that there is no range
of parameter values where two or more types of equilibria overlap, if democracy does not
collapse, i.e., if π ≥ 2e.
The messages of Propositions 1 and 2 can be illustrated in the (e,π)-space (Figure 2).
Let us ﬁrst consider the region of low campaigning costs (e<e ). The region is split by two
lines, π =2 e and π =1 +4
3e. Below the lower line (π =2 e), there is no democracy (N) in the
sense that one or both of parties fail to nominate a candidate. Between the lines, candidates





, there is universal democracy (U).
Figure 2 also shows the role of campaigning costs. If we exclude them, we will stay on the
vertical axis e =0of Figure 2. In that case, increasing the pay of politicians would increase
candidate quality until universal democracy is reached.8 As can be seen from Figure 2, such
a result does not carry over to high or moderate values of campaigning costs.
8Indeed, a similar ﬁnding emerges from Besley (2003) where there is neither campaigning costs nor
signaling.
11The region of moderate campaigning costs (e ∈ [e,e]) is divided into ﬁve subareas by two
lines, π =2 e and π =4 e, and two curves, π =2−
√
1 − 2e and π =1+
√
1 − 2e.A s i n
the case of low campaigning costs, below the lower line (π =2 e), democracy collapses and,














and the upper line (π =4 e), candidates are competent. Finally,
between the curves the candidates are mediocre (M).
The region of high campaigning costs (e>e) is split by three lines, π =2 e, π =1 + 2 e and
π =4 e. Again, there is no democracy below the lowest line (π =2 e) and universal democracy
prevails above the upper line (π =4 e). The area between the intermediate and the highest
lines constitutes the key diﬀerence between the high and low campaigning costs. When the
costs are high, candidates are competent (C) before political rewards increase suﬃciently to
introduce universal democracy. The area between the lowest and the intermediate lines is a
grey area of political ambiguity (A), where there is no symmetric political equilibrium.
Even if there is no symmetric political equilibrium, an asymmetric equilibrium typically
exists. When the potential candidates of the two parties do not share an identical ability
distribution, voters’ rational expectations create diﬀerent beliefs than so far analyzed. One
system of beliefs and voting strategies is such that the voters vote for the dominant party’s
candidate unless he or she signals low and the other party’s candidate signals high. In such
a dominant party equilibrium, the voters’ belief function describes a common assessment
that candidate d of the dominant party is of higher expected ability than candidate u of the
underdog party also in the case that the two candidates emit the same signal. Given Id, Iu,
sd,a n dsu, the voters can share one of two alternative beliefs. We denote the belief that
E(ad) >E (au) by 1 and the belief that E(ad) <E (au) by −1.L e tµ(Id,I u,s d,s u) ∈ {1,−1}
denote the voters’ belief given the candidates’ entry decisions and the signals they have
emitted. The beliefs in the dominant party equilibrium can then be written as µ(1,1,H,L)
=1 , µ(1,1,L,H)=−1, µ(1,1,H,H)=1 ,a n dµ(1,1,L,L)=1 . It is straightforward but
somewhat tedious to show that, given these beliefs favoring the dominant party’s candidate
when the signals are equal, no one is willing to run for the underdog party.9 This ﬁnding hints
at strong incumbency advantages in political competition that can lead to path dependence
in the quality of governments, as in Caselli and Morelli (2002).
In assessing the reliability of observations here, a caveat should be kept in mind. Models
with private information raise the question of how robust are ﬁndings with respect to the
parameter that is private information. Fortunately, this is not an issue here. On the one
hand, our ﬁndings are broadly speaking similar to the ones in Messner and Polborn (2003)
where the reward from oﬃce, (π −e), is private information and vary across candidates. On
the other hand, letting campaigning costs be private information and vary across candidates
would certainly change the ﬁndings, but the problem would then be rather uninteresting,
since the voters care only about candidates’ ability, not their campaigning costs. Such an
assumption might be more fruitful in analyzing private provision of a public good in a small










Figure 2: Political Equilibria
13group like a university department or a school district, and could result in wars of attrition
as suggested by Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996). Our model
predicts that the wars of attrition may emerge in the region of the collapse of democracy,
but for a wide range of parameter values becoming a politician is attractive at least for
some citizens. Because in almost all elections in large jurisdictions there is more than one
candidate, politicians at least in major elections seem to be pleased to be elected rather than
reluctantly concede to run.
3.2 Interpretation
As illustrated by Figure 2, political equilibria are complex but unique. The condition for
citizen i to enter politics, (8), can be rewritten as
(π − ai) · P(w | ai) ≥ e. (13)
The left-hand side of (13) presents the expected increase in income created by candidacy.
It is the product of the net return from winning election, π − ai, and the probability of
winning, P(w | ai). The right-hand side is the campaigning cost, e,p a i dw i t hc e r t a i n t y .
Equation (13) shows that politics is attractive if the expected increase in income exceeds
campaigning costs, and that a change in either π or e h a sb o t had i r e c ta n da ni n d i r e c te ﬀect
on the attractiveness of politics. Keeping P(w | ai) constant, the direct eﬀect of an increase
in π or a decrease in e encourages the entry to politics for all ability levels. To arrive at full
behavioral responses, we also have to take into account the induced changes in P(w | ai).
If the direct eﬀect improves the average quality of candidates, there will be a reduction in
P(w | ai). This indirect eﬀect then discourages the entry to politics. Whether there is
ultimately an improvement in the candidate quality depends on the relative magnitude of
the direct and indirect eﬀects. For example, consider the shift from the area I to area M in
Figure 2. The direct eﬀect of an increase in π renders politics lucrative for some high ability
citizens. Because new high ability citizens become candidates, P(w | 0) decreases. When
campaigning costs are moderate, the indirect eﬀect can dominate over the direct eﬀect for
low-ability citizens. As a result, the citizens of the lowest abilities leave politics and the
average candidate quality improves.
To illustrate the direct and indirect eﬀects, we present in Figure 3 a and a as a function
of π, ﬁxing e = 4
9.T h e b e h a v i o r o f a is easy to explain: The direct eﬀect of increasing
π always dominates for high-ability types, so that increasingly higher ability citizens ﬁnd
politics attractive when the reward for elected politicians rises. The behavior of low-ability
citizens is more complicated. Initially an increase in the reward in a case of being elected
more than oﬀsets the decrease in the probability of winning caused by the entry of the
high-ability citizens, and all low-ability citizens want to become candidates. However, when
4
3 ≤ π<5
3, the candidates with the lowest ability opt out if the reward rises, because the
indirect eﬀect of the decreased P(w | ai) dominates over the direct eﬀect of the increased
π − a.O n c e π = 5











Figure 3: Set of Candidates (e=4/9)
further increase in π no longer dilutes the low-ability citizens’ prospects of being elected,
thus stimulating them again to participate in politics. Once π ≥ 16
9 is reached, universal
democracy prevails. As a result, candidates are incompetent when 8




3, and competent when 5
3 ≤ π<16
9 . The average quality of candidates ﬁrst
increases from zero until it reaches 2
3 at π = 5




4 Screening the Best Candidates
In the previous section the set of candidates was determined by the model, but the reward
for oﬃce holders and campaigning costs remained exogenous. This then raises the question
of where they come from. Although a thorough exploration on the issue is beyond the scope
of this study, we here brieﬂy assess whether it is possible to design rewards and campaigning
costs to maximize the candidate quality. Proposition 1 suggests that such a political system
is impossible when campaigning is cheap. Neither is it possible to screen the best candidates
when campaigning costs are moderate, as the following proposition veriﬁes.
Proposition 3 If and only if e ≥ 1 and π =1 +2 e, only the citizens with a =1want to
15become politicians.
Proof. F i r s tn o t ef r o m( A 7 )t h a ta is decreasing in π.T o g e t h e r w i t h L e m m a 4 t h i s
means that the maximum candidate quality occurs for moderate campaigning costs when
π =2−
√
1 − 2e and, for high campaigning costs, when π =1+2 e. Substituting ﬁrst
π =2−
√
1 − 2e for (A7) shows that a < 1
2. Substituting then π =1+2 e for (A7) shows
that a =2 e − 1,w h e n1
2 <e<1,a n da =1 ,w h e ne ≥ 1.
To put Proposition 3 in the (e,π)-space, the candidate quality obtains its maximum on
the line π =1+2 e, which is the middle line in the region of high campaigning costs (e>e)
in Figure 2.
Proposition 3 establishes that by regulating both campaigning costs and the payoﬀ from
winning an election, only the highest-ability citizens can be induced to run for oﬃce. More-
over, this can be done without giving rents to the candidates. When e ≥ 1 and π =1+2 e,
the highest-ability citizens are indiﬀerent between running for an oﬃce and staying outside
politics. Proposition 3 also conﬁrms the crucial role of campaigning costs in determining
the impact of the reward for oﬃce holders on the candidate quality. When the campaigning
costs are high or moderate, there is a wide range of parameter values where the candidate
quality is decreasing in the reward for oﬃce holders.
Note that the ﬁndings here do not suggest that it would necessarily be socially desirable to
attract the highest-ability citizens to politics. In our model the ability in politics is perfectly
correlated with the earning potential in the private sector. The higher the ability of the
elected oﬃcial, the larger is the loss to the private sector. Thus, only if the marginal social
beneﬁt of talent in politics exceeds the social loss of it not being employed in the private
sector, the most talented citizens should be politicians. Using the scope of an electoral
district as a proxy for social beneﬁts from good politics, it seems that the expected quality
of politicians should be maximum in national and state-level tasks. In contrast, it may
be socially too costly to attract the most talented citizens to politics in small towns and
school districts. This may be a reason why the reward typically rises with the scope of
an electoral district. In the United States, for example, annual pay for state legislators
ranges from $99,000 plus per diem in California to mere $200 for two-year term in New
Hampshire without per diem (Book of States 2000/2001). Proper evaluation of the relative
social beneﬁts from politics and private sector activities would, however, require a general
equilibrium environment and is left for future research.
5E x t e n s i o n s
5.1 Costly Primary Elections
In this section, we drop the assumption that participation in party primaries is costless.
Let us assume there may be n ∈ {0,1,...,k} candidates in the party primaries where n is
an integer and k is the maximum number of candidates in primary election. The parties
randomly choose a citizen and oﬀer her or him the possibility to enter the party primaries.
16The citizens who accept the oﬀer and enter the party primaries have to pay the cost ep of
campaigning there. The process of randomly oﬀering the chance to participate continues until
k citizens have accepted the oﬀer, or all citizens have been asked, whichever occurs ﬁrst. For
brevity, we assume that no information on the candidate quality is revealed in the primaries.
Thus, the ﬁnal candidate of the party is randomly selected amongst the candidates of a party
primary and, consequently, the probability of being selected in a primary election is 1
n.T h e
ﬁnal candidates of the parties then enter the general election, and pay the campaigning cost
eg, producing the noisy signal of their ability. The rest of the analysis follows the section 2.3
in so far the abilities of the citizens willing to enter the primaries form a continuum. The
probability of being selected in the primary election is, with a full slate of candidates, 1
k.A s
a result, if a citizen with ability ai is oﬀered a possibility to participate in a primary election,
she or he accepts the oﬀer only if
1
k
[P(w | ai)π +( 1− P(w | ai))ai − eg − ai] ≥ ep. (14)
The term in the brackets in (14) is the expected payoﬀ from running in the general
election. Note that equation (5) still deﬁnes P(w | ai) with f(x) reinterpreted as the density
function of those citizens’ abilities who will accept an oﬀer to participate in a party primary.
A citizen enters the primary election if the expected payoﬀ multiplied by the probability of
being elected in the primary, 1
k, exceeds the cost of the entry to the primary. Comparing
inequalities (8) and (14) shows that if we deﬁne e ≡ eg + kep, we can directly extend the
analysis from section 3 to the costly participation in party primaries. The only diﬀerences
are in region N (and potentially in region A) in Figure 2, as in the case of costly participation
in party primaries a party may end up with a less than full slate of candidates in the primary
election.
5.2 Ideological Parties
So far, we have analyzed politics without ideological concerns. However, as the contribution
by Wittman (1983) indicates, a complete view of politics calls for incorporating ideological
motivations into the model. While some voters simply desire to select the most competent
candidate, many other voters deeply care about the ideological content of politics. They
may require that the candidate shares their view point on some ideologically charged issues
like adopting the Euro, nuclear power, or abortion. Such ideological voters also typically
work as volunteers in party organizations or in campaigns of the candidates standing up for
what they consider being the just cause. The presence of a polarized ideological issue might
constitute a barrier of entry to independent candidates or third parties.
Let us assume that the elected politicians vote either Yes or No in an ideologically charged
issue in addition to providing public goods. A share of citizens only care about the candidate
quality and vote solely based on signals emitted by candidates, but the remaining are evenly
divided in favor of Yes and No in the ideologically charged issue. In the political equilibrium,
one party tends to cater to the citizens in favor of Yes and another party to the citizens in
17favor of No. Both parties require their candidates to commit to the ideological position
of the party. Both candidates have an equal number of secured voters, while the election
would ﬁnally be decided by mobile voters who make up their mind based on signals emitted
during campaigning. In so far as the ability distribution of potential candidates of parties
choosing Yes and No are identical, the results derived previously can be directly generalized
to a model allowing for ideological concerns.
Moreover, a third party may ﬁnd it hard to enter the political competition. For instance,
suppose that forming a party organization or campaigning requires more than one volunteer
from the group of ideological voters. Then, no citizen favoring Yes or No will unilaterally
switch to support the third party, even if it adopts the citizen’s preferred ideological position.
This suggests that the two-party system is maintained as a part of the political equilibrium
in the sense of Nash.
5.3 Primary Elections with Signaling
Our results can be generalized to allow candidates to emit a signal in both primary and
general elections. We assume that there are no costs of participating in party primary, while
the costs of general election are as in section 2. The probability that a primary election
candidate i emits a signal H is given by:
Pr(s
p




where δ,δ > 0, is the additional noise term capturing the stylized fact that screening
of politicians tends to be more accurate in general elections. Therefore, even citizens with
a =0have a positive probability of emitting signal H in the party primary.





where ψ>0. Our assumption implies that the density function of citizens of ability
a is decreasing in ability, reaching ψ1+δ
δ with ability of zero and ψ with ability of one. If
citizens of ability type a participate in party primary, the density of citizens of that ability




a+δ. The density of primary
election candidates emitting a high signal is the density of candidates of that type multiplied
by the probability of each candidate signaling H. For all ability types, this is equal to
ψ
2.
As signaling in primary elections is a useful signal of ability and probability of success in
the general election, it is in the interest of both parties to select candidates for the general
election among those signaling H in the primary election. As there are no other visible
diﬀerences between primary election candidates except their signal, candidates for general
elections are chosen randomly amongst those signaling H in the primary election. Thus, in so
far participation in the primary election remains costless all results from section 3 also hold
18in a two-stage signaling model, where candidates emit a signal in the primary and general
election.
The above example suggests that parties can play an active role in the political process by
providing an additional screening stage. Apart from the special case of only citizens of one
ability type willing to run, the ability distribution of the candidates in the general election
strictly dominates the distribution of those in the primary election. The ability distribution
of the general election candidates is in our example uniform (with a single point as a special
case), whereas in the primary election the density of potential candidates of a given ability
is decreasing in the ability. As the polarized ideological issue analyzed in section 5.2, the
screening provided by the two established parties may hinder the entry of new parties or
independent candidates.
6 Conclusion and Further Research
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of campaigning costs and the reward for oﬃce holders on the can-
didate quality are surprisingly complicated. Depending the level of campaigning costs, an
increase in the reward for oﬃce holders may increase or decrease the candidate quality. If
the costs are high, it may be optimal to decrease the reward to screen the best candidates.
When campaigning is cheap, there is no way to screen the best candidates, because the
low-ability citizens have a comparative advantage in politics. The ﬁndings suggest that it is
possible to design a political system to maximize candidate quality but only when private
campaigning costs are high.
Our simple and tractable model invites a number of extensions. Because uncovering
the crucial role of campaigning costs in determining the quality of politicians is one of our
key contributions, future research should in turn devote more attention to the determinants
of campaigning costs. For example, one could assume that the level of campaigning costs
is a choice variable and that the probability of a high signal conditional on the ability
level is increasing in campaigning costs. Another consideration regarding the endogeneity
of campaigning costs is the incumbent’s advantage in campaigning. In many countries,
especially in the US, campaigning costs are typically lower for an incumbent. As brieﬂy
discussed in section 3, if incumbency advantage creates asymmetric beliefs, there can be
path dependence in the quality of governments as in Caselli and Morelli (2002).
Our model also indicates that corruption and lobbying can have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
politicians’ quality, depending on whether they primarily increase the reward for elected
oﬃce holders or lower the campaigning costs of candidates. If campaigning costs are mod-
erate, bribes to elected politicians can paradoxically deter low-ability citizens from running,
moving political equilibrium from incompetent candidates to mediocre or even to competent
candidates (see Figure 2). If candidates are initially competent, however, the bribes can trig-
ger the entry of low-ability citizens to politics, diminishing the average candidate quality.
This may help to explain why bribery is generally condemned in developed countries with
moderate or high levels of campaigning costs and rewards, while being often tolerated in
19developing countries. In a developing country where neither campaigning costs nor oﬃcial
rewards are high, bribery can help to attract citizens with higher skills to enter politics,
perhaps at the cost of attracting also citizens with questionable ethics. The eﬀect of cam-
paign contributions is similarly ambiguous. If campaigning is relatively expensive, campaign
contributions can help to prevent a collapse of democracy, where only one or neither party
is able to nominate a candidate. In many countries, notably in the United States, the cost
of running a proper campaign can exceed several times the reward for elected oﬃcials, sug-
gesting that the contributions are necessary to maintain an active democracy. In a variety
of circumstances, however, campaign contributions can also reduce the candidate quality.
If campaigning costs are to large extent covered by special interest groups, they will no
longer deter low-ability citizens from entering politics. Nonetheless, a thorough analysis of
corruption and lobbying would require their careful modelling along the lines of Grossman
and Helpman (1994) and Besley and Coate (2001).
Catering to special interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions can also gen-
erate an entry barrier to independent candidates or third parties in a similar manner as a
polarized ideological issue in section 5.2 or screening through the primaries of established
parties in section 5.3. Studying campaign contributions and informative advertising is clearly
an area that deserves further research. Combining our framework with the advances by Prat
(2002), and Schultz (2002) could turn out to be fruitful in this task. Further insights into
equilibrium political structure could be obtained by incorporating some features from Pout-
vaara (2003) into our model. In his model potential party activists decide whether to join
a party based on previous party platforms. Party platforms for the subsequent election
are then chosen by median party members. Even with the given party platforms, there is
uncertainty of electoral outcome. Assuming that such uncertainty arises from electoral cam-
paigning and diﬀerences in candidates’ abilities as in this paper, one could let party members
choose a candidate with a given ideological preference and an unknown ability. Electoral
landscape would then be jointly determined by campaigning costs, political rewards, and
ideological distribution of party activists and voters.
Following the citizen-candidate approach developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and
Besley and Coate (1997), we have viewed politics as a career choice, motivated by private re-
turns from holding oﬃce. However, neither the reward for oﬃc eh o l d e r sn o rt h ec a m p a i g n i n g
costs in our model are necessarily monetary. For example, the reward may include ideological
concerns and psychological satisfaction from holding oﬃce that may be driven by ”selﬁsh”
concerns of receiving fame and public recognition. The campaigning costs may also include
psychological eﬀects stemming, e.g., from searching journalism and negative campaigning.10
Therefore, our model suggests that both ideological competition between parties and jour-
nalistic practices aﬀect the set of citizens willing to become politicians. Consensus politics
together with dull press keep the ideological rewards for oﬃce holders and campaigning costs
10Such psychological costs can be even more eﬀective than pure monetary costs if the rewards are also
mainly psychological and if citizens diﬀer in their private wealth. With diminishing marginal utility of
private consumption, politics associated with predominantly monetary campaigning costs would not deter
rich citizens with low abilities, but might deter poor citizens with high abilities.
20low and, consequently, the high-ability citizens outside politics. Low quality of politicians
f r o me s t a b l i s h e dp a r t i e sm a yi nt u r nl e a v et h ed o o ro p e nf o rp o p u l i s tm o v e m e n t s .T h i sl e a d s
t oab o l di n t e r p r e t a t i o no fo u rﬁndings: maintaining ideological tension between mainstream
parties and providing an appropriate monetary reward for elected politicians together with
a vigilant press may be used to attract high-ability candidates from established parties and
preempt entry by populist movements.
Appendix.
Voters’ beliefs
In this appendix we derive voters’ belief from citizens’ candidacy strategies. Let f(a)
denote the subjective density function that voters attach to a candidate being of ability a
before a signal is received, and let a and a be the lowest and the highest expected ability
of a candidate. Furthermore, we assume that citizens rationally anticipate that f(a)= 1
a−a,
as this turns out to be the case in equilibrium. The expected ability of a randomly selected
candidate before a signal is revealed is E(a)=
R a
a (f(a) · a)da =
a+a
2 . The expected ability
subject to signal H is, by Bayes’ rule,
E(ai | H)=
R a
a f(a) · a · Pr(si = H | a)da
Pr(s = H)
.











2(a2 + aa + a2)
3(a + a)
.
Correspondingly, the expected ability of candidate j signalling L is
E(aj | L)=
R a
a f(a) · a · Pr(sj = L | a)da
Pr(s = L)
.




3a +3 a − 2a2 − 2a2 − 2aa
6 − 3a − 3a
.
The candidate with a high signal is of higher expected quality, if E(ai | H) >E (aj | L).I f
a>a ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o3(a−a)2 > 0. Therefore, we have established that when a>a ,t h e
candidate signaling H has a higher expected ability than the candidate signaling L.B e c a u s e
a signal about a citizen’s ability is emitted only if the citizen decides to enter primary
elections and is selected as the oﬃcial candidate of a party, voters’ belief µ(Ii,I j,s i,s j)
∈ {1,−1,0} when a>acan be described as follows: µ(1,1,H,L)=1 , µ(1,1,L,H)= −1,
µ(1,1,H,H)=0 ,a n dµ(1,1,L,L)=0 . If all candidates are of the same ability (a = a),
the signals in principle will lose their informativeness, and we can not use Bayes’ rule to
21calculate the voters’ belief. Because this case is quite immaterial with continuous ability
distribution we, for simplicity, assume that when a = a, µ(Ii,I j,s i,s j) remains unchanged
∀si,s j. Such equilibrium where voters pay attention to signals even if a = a is also the only
one that would be included in the set of trembling-hand perfect or sequential equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 1. For citizens willing to run with a probability strictly between
zero and one, the left-hand side of (9) would have to equal zero. Otherwise, citizens would
ﬁnd it optimal to play a pure strategy of running with a probability of either zero or one.
Diﬀerentiating the left-hand side of (9) with respect to a yields 1
2(π + A − 1) − ai.T h i si s
positive (negative) when 1
2(π + A − 1) > (<)ai. Thus, the left-hand side of (9) is zero in at
most two points in the interval [0,1] and, consequently, the measure of citizens indiﬀerent
between running and staying outside politics is zero.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . When all citizens are potential candidates, the average ability of
potential candidates A equals 1
2. After substituting A = 1
2 f o r( 1 1 )w es e et h a tt h ec i t i z e n
with the lowest ability (a =0 ) is willing to become a candidate if, and only if,
π ≥ 4e. (A1)
Similarly, substituting A = 1
2 for (12) and simplifying shows that the citizen with the highest




e.( A 2 )
Equations (A1) and (A2) suggest that all citizens are candidates if π ≥ max(4e,1+4
3e).T h e
proof is completed by noting that the condition 4e T 1+4
3e is equivalent to the condition
e T e.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . When the citizens with an intermediate ability seek candidacy,
the solutions of (10) give the candidates with the highest and lowest ability. From (11) and
(12) we then get that A =
a+a
2 is equivalent to A = π+A−1
2 . As a result, the average quality
of potential candidates reads as
A = π − 1.( A 3 )
Substituting (A3) for (11) and (12) gives the threshold levels for the candidates’ abilities
a = π − 1 −
√
1 − 2e (A4)
and
a = π − 1+
√
1 − 2e.( A 5 )
From (A4) and (A5) we see that a necessary condition for the equilibrium is e ≤ e.E q u a t i o n
(A4) shows that a > 0 only if π>1+
√
1 − 2e and (A5) shows that a<1 only if π<
2 −
√
1 − 2e. On the one hand, the equilibrium may exist only in the region where e ≤ e
and, on the other hand, 2 −
√
1 − 2e ≥ 1+
√
1 − 2e only if e ≥ e. The equilibrium where
the citizens with an intermediate ability become candidates thus exists only if π ∈ (1 + √
1 − 2e,2 −
√
1 − 2e) and e ∈ [e,e].
22Proof of Lemma 4. When the citizens with the lowest ability choose a career in the
private sector, the average quality of the candidates is A =
1+a
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π − 1 −
p
(π +1 ) 2 − 16e
i
, (A7)
is greater than zero only if π<4e. The larger root can be excluded, as it would be positive
also when π ≥ 4e. That would violate the condition that the citizen with a =0is unwilling
to be a candidate. By using (A7), we see that the average quality of the potential candidates
A =
1+a







(π +1 ) 2 − 16e
i
. (A8)
We next conﬁrm that the citizen with the highest ability is willing to be a candidate, i.e.,










Upon some manipulation, (A9) can be simpliﬁed to
(2 − A)(π − 1) − 2e ≥ 0. (A10)
After substituting (A8) for (A10) and some laborious algebra, the condition can be re-
expressed as
(π − 1)
2(π − 3) − 2e(π − 1)(π − 4) − 4e
2 ≥ 0. (A11)
We can now characterize the equilibria where only the most competent citizens
present themselves as candidates. Although (A11) is highly non-linear in π,i ti se a s yt o
show that it holds only if π ≥ 2+
√




1 − 2e,2e +1
¤
.W h e ne ≤ e,
2+
√
1 − 2e ≥ 2e +1≥ 4e. Because, by (A7), a > 0 only if π<4e, the relevant parameter
range is π ∈ [2−
√
1 − 2e,4e) which is a non-empty set only if e>e . In sum, the equilibrium
where C(e,π)=[ a,1] exists for e ∈ [e,e] when π ∈ [2 −
√
1 − 2e,4e).W h e ne>e,( A 1 1 )
23has a unique solution, which is π =2 e +1and, accordingly, the equilibrium where C(e,π)
=[ a,1] exists for e>e when π ∈ [2e +1 ,4e).
Proof of Lemma 5. When the citizens with the highest abilities choose a career in
private sector, the average quality of the potential candidates is A = a
2. Assuming that a<1
and substituting a










.( A 1 2 )
Since the smaller root of (A12) is strictly less than (12), we observe that only the larger root











satisﬁes our assumption that it is less than unity only if π<1+4
3e.W en e x tc o n ﬁrm that
the citizen with the lowest ability is also willing to be a candidate, i.e., that a =0 .F r o m
(12) we see that this holds if




After some algebra, this can be expressed as
π(1 − A) ≥ 2e. (A14)
A necessary condition is thus that π ≥ 2e. Substituting A = a
2 and (A13) into (A14), and
simplifying yields, after tedious algebra,
(π − 2e)(π
2 − 2π +2 e) ≤ 0. (A15)








, which is non-empty only
if e ≤ e.B e c a u s e2e ≥ 1 −
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. Because, by (A13), a<1 only if π<1+4
3e, we need to check out
when
√
1 − 2e ≤ 4
3e. This occurs when e ≥ e. Thus, the equilibrium where C(e,π)=[ 0 ,a]






,a n df o re ≤ e when π ∈ [2e,1+4
3e).
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . i) If π<e , no citizen is willing to campaign even if being assured
of winning. ii) Let us make the counter-assumption that both parties are able to nominate a
candidate in the region π ∈ [e,2e). Because π<2e, the expected payoﬀ from candidacy can-
not be positive, even without opportunity costs, unless the expected probability of winning
the general election is more than 1
2. As this cannot hold for candidates of both parties, there
is no equilibrium in which citizens would present themselves as candidates of both parties
with a positive probability. If only one party is nominating a candidate, P(w | ai)=1 ∀ai.
By (8), politics is then attractive for those with ai ≤ π−e so that an equilibrium where only
24the other party nominates a candidate exists for π ∈ [e,2e). iii) Lemmas 2 − 5 deﬁne the
range of parameter values covering the symmetric political equilibria in pure strategies where
politics is suﬃciently attractive so that both parties are certain to nominate candidates, and
parts i) and ii) of this lemma cover the case in which at most one party is able to nominate
a candidate. The area e>e, π ∈ [2e,1+2e) is not covered by any of these, and so it has no
symmetric political equilibrium in pure strategies. Lemma 1 excludes non-degenerate mixed
strategy equilibria. What remains to show is that there is no equilibrium where citizens of
only one ability would become candidates. Because considering an equilibrium where the set
of candidates is of zero measure is rather weak robustness check, we show that there is no
equilibrium where a small coalition of citizens would become candidates. To prove this, make
the counterassumption that there would be such a coalition a ∈ [a∗+ε,a ∗−ε] that is willing
to become candidates but that no citizen outside the coalition is willing to run. In order to
guarantee that citizens with an ability arbitrarily close to a∗+ ε and a∗− ε do not run, the
expected surplus from candidacy must equal zero for the candidates with abilities a∗+ ε and
a∗− ε. By (9) and A = a∗, this holds only when ε −→ 0 and a∗ = π − 2e.H o w e v e r ,t h e
expected payoﬀ on candidacy of a citizen with a = π − 2e + υ is
υ(2e−1−υ)
2 ,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e
with a suﬃciently small but positive υ, contradicting the tentative equilibrium where only
citizens with a∗ = π − 2e are willing to run.
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